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With the avoidance of Russell’s paradox and its cognates as one paramount motivation, and 
the avoidance of ungrounded mathematical objects as another, the twentieth century from 
early on saw the initiation of various foundational theories which altogether avoided an 
invocation of infinite power sets. This is famously the case in the predicativist tradition going 
back to Herman Weyl’s Das Kontinuum, and further investigated later principally by Solomon 
Feferman, but also by others. This was clearly also an important motivational aspect of  the 
perhaps less rigorously formulated original intent of Luitzen Brouwer’s intuitionist program, 
and it is presently manifest much more precisely within parts of the intuitionist tradition in 
that Per Martin Löf’s constructive Type Theory lacks an analogue of the infinitary power-set 
operation, as does Peter Aczel’s constructive set theory CZF. 
The reverse mathematics program initiated by Harvey Friedman seemed to have 
established that only a very small fragment of Second order Arithmetic suffices for ordinary 
classical mathematics, i.e. mathematics which is not concerned with purely set-theoretic 
issues or those of its “higher reaches”. The system we propose, (minimalistic) librationism1, 
has mathematical strength beyond the fully impredicative system     CA0 plus the Bar-rule 
in a sense to be made more precise below. As librationism also sheds important light on other 
important phenomena, as the paradoxes, it seems that it may advantageously serve as a 
foundation for the mathematics needed for science, semantics and philosophical speculation.  
I point out first in this separate paragraph that the last sentence in the previous 
paragraph may seem dated on account of other important very recent work by Friedman 
which shows that certain sentences of quite concrete mathematics in his Boolean Relation 
Theory needs something like ZFC plus the existence of all inaccessible strong Mahlo 
cardinals of finite order to be settled correctly. The interested reader should consult his home 
page for the book draft on Boolean Relation Theory. But Friedman has there also shown that 
what suffices to prove the exotic cases is ACA (which is often formulated as ACA0 + the 
existence of the Turing jump for all subsets of  ) plus 1-Con(SMAH). The latter is an 
arithmetical schema which to the effect states the 1-consistency of Friedman’s SMAH, i.e. 
that all              provable in ZF+                                       
   
   are also 
true. As     CA0 plus the Bar-rule much exceeds ACA, which is even weaker than ACA 
(=ACA(0) plus full induction), and our semi formal system librationism, for reasons that 
become clear below, settles all arithmetical sentences, we know a priori at a meta level that 
Friedman’s exotic cases have librationist resolutions. How such resolutions may come about, 
and what they amount to, will remain to be seen. To find the resolutions will most likely not 
be a trivial exercise, perhaps quite on the contrary; it must, as is the standard procedure in 
isolating partial axiomatic and inferential principles of librationism, take its recourse to the 
                                                 
1
 I have coined the term ”librationism” from the term ”libration” which is used for certain oscillating phenomena 
e.g. in astronomy.  This seems a useful name for our system as it is not taken, it reminds of the peculiar shift in 
perspectives which are involved in the theory’s treatment of paradoxical phenomena and is also close in spelling 
and pronunciation to the term “liberalism” which I have used in some earlier lectures and publications. The latter 
term suggested itself because of the emancipatory feature that all set terms are allowed and dealt with in a 
comprehensive and, it is hoped, justified and edifying manner. 
semi inductive semantics which we describe below. The point here is that we, from the 
librationist outlook, ultimately do not need to buy into ZFC-like points of view, or, more 
generally, opinions that include infinite power sets, in order to account even for Friedman’s 
new exotic incompleteness phenomena. 
There are two important traditions which we shall recall briefly in order to situate 
librationism. (1) Since the work of Saul Kripke and others there has been an explosive interest 
in self-referential truth. An important strand in that development was initiated independently 
by Hans Herzberger and Anil Gupta, and now serves as a background for semi inductive and 
revisionary style semantics. For us, the system LES introduced at the end of §69 in Andrea 
Cantini’s important monograph has been influential. LES is an axiomatic theory of truth and 
abstraction justified by a semi inductive type semantics, and which respects classical logic. 
Librationism properly extends LES, and also respects classical logic. (2) Starting with 
Stanislaw Jaskowski’s non-adjunctive system and the work of Newton da Costa, many formal 
calculi weaker than classical logic have been proposed in the paraconsistent tradition so as to 
allow naïve comprehension. But it cannot be seen that these views offer a satisfactory analysis 
of how mathematical objects are engendered by the accompanying naïve comprehension 
principle. Often e.g. ZFC is merely taken for granted as an inside paradox free theory, and 
paradoxical phenomena are just assumed to be inside an outside shell. One may challenge that 
these views thus ride piggy-back on classical views without offering the analysis we are in 
need of and which should be of our interest. Still, as the acute reader will see, librationism 
shares some important features with paraconsistent approaches. 
Let us for this exposition simplify and take our language to have parentheses for 
punctuation, infinitely many variables v0, v1, v2…., connectives , ,   , , , quantifiers , , 
epsilon , the truth operator T and the set builder {:}. Formation rules and inter-definability 
relations are as would be expected by my audience, with the addition that A is a formula only 
if TA is a formula. I point out that set brackets are not eliminable as in extensional set 
theories. Semantically, we rely on a semi-inductive process on ordinals. In our context we 
need no “boot-strapping policy”. {vi:A} is a set-constant if A has at most vi  free. Fix an 
enumeration e(0), e(1), … of all set-constants.  [A] is the Gödel-number of the formula A for 
a given coding. X is a function from ordinals to subsets of natural numbers and  a relation 
between such subsets and formulas as given by the double recursion: For any ordinal ,  
 
(1) X()={[A]:(&(X()A))}  
(2) X(α)⊨TA iff [A]X(α)  
(3) X(α)⊨a {vi:A} iff X(α)⊨TA(a/vi)  
(4) X(α)⊨AB iff X(α)⊨A and X(α)⊨B 
(5) X(α)⊨A iff not X(α)⊨A 
(6) If a=e(i) then X()A(vi) iff X()A(a) 
(7) X(α)⊨viA iff for all variables (names!) vj, X(α)⊨A(vj/vi).  
 
By adapting results going back to Herzberger there will be a stabilization ordinal  so 
that X()TA iff (X()A). Notice that X()A or X()A, and also that by (7) 
the isolated minimalist
2
 model, and thence the librationist system, is closed under the non-
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 We think of the model and resulting librationist system as minimalist because the truth operator  T has the 
empty extension at ordinal zero, i.e. X(Ø)TA for all formulas A.  
constructive Z-rule: If  X()A(u) for all variables (or for all terms) u, then X()xA(x). 
We at this point make a crucial shift in metalogical attention to {A: X()TA} as our 
designated model (modulo the enumeration e invoked in the semantical set up), and define: 
 
╟A=D X()TA.  
 
By induced principles at X() we have X()TA iff not X()TA, so we define A 
to be a maxim, ╟MA, iff ╟A and not ╟A. Minors are given by ╟mA iff ╟A and ╟A. rr for 
r={x:xx} is e.g. a minor. Theorems of classical logic are examples of maxims. It can be 
shown that identity can be introduced à la Leibniz. Induced inferential principles are 
unfamiliar, and one should not expect that these can be effectively circumscribed. We have 
isolated more than ten salient ones, but it is not of relevance to describe these or the isolated 
partial axiomatic principles in a short presentation as here; instead it is left to the reader to 
ponder on these matters, or else s/he is directed to other work pointed to or by the author. It is 
noteworthy that the traditional inferential schema modus ponens holds for ╟M (so we call this 
adjusted inferential schema modus maximus in the librationist framework) but not for ╟m, as 
we do e.g. not have that the conjunction of ╟mA and ╟mA entails that ╟m. In consequence, 
librationism may be understood as a non-adjunctive system. All induced principles for truth 
and set-theoretic abstraction are, or so I argue, incontrovertible. One should, I again 
emphasize, appreciate that librationism is a semi-formal system, or framework, so that we will 
have that ╟A or ╟A and that it is also closed under the Z-rule described above. 
For the reader’s benefit, I list some axiomatic and inferential principles of librationism 
in order to have a partial description (it is understood that all generalizations of instances of 
the following schemas are axioms, so that generalization is not a primitive inference rule): 
 
L1M  A(BA) 
L2M  (A(BC))((AB)(AC)) 
L3M  (BA)(AB) 
L4M  AxA, provided x is not free in A. 
L5M  x(AB)(xAxB) 
L6M  xAA(t/x), if t is substitutable for x in A. 
 
LO1M  T(AB)(TATB) 
LO2M  TATA 
LO3M  TBTB(TTATA)  
LO4M  TBTB(TATTA) 
LO5M  T(TAA)(TATA) 
LO6M  xTATxA 
LO7M  TxAxTA 
LO8m  TAA 
LO9m  ATA 
LO10m xTATxA 
LO11m TxAxTA 
 
Schemas that are maxims have a capital “M”, while minor schemas, i.e. those that 
have minor instances, have a minuscule “m” at the end of its appellation as given here.  
 We next point out the librationist comprehension principle: 
 
LCM x(x{y:A}TA(x/y)), if x is substitutable for y in A. 
 
We proceed to provide some salient inferential principles that we can show hold in 
librationism: 
 
IR1: If ╟MA and ╟M(A⊃B then ╟MB (“modus maximus”) 
IR2: If ╟mA and ╟M(A⊃B then ╟B (“modus subiunctio”) 
IR3: If ╟MA and ╟m(A⊃B then ╟mB (“modus antecedentiae”) 
IR4: If ╟MA then ╟MTA (“modus ascent maximus”) 
IR5: If ╟mA then ╟mTA (“modus ascent minor”) 
IR6: If ╟MTA then ╟MA (“modus descent maximus”) 
IR7: If ╟mTA then ╟mA (“modus descent minor”) 
IR8: If ╟MTA then ╟MTA (”modus scandent maximus”) 
IR9: If ╟mTA then ╟mTA (“modus scandent minor”) 
IR10: If ╟MxTA then ╟MTxA  (“modus Barcan”) 
IR11: If ╟TxA then ╟ xTA  (“modus attestor”) 
 (Also: If ╟mTxA then ╟m xTA) 
IR12: If ╟mA and ╟mB then ╟mTA∧TB (“modus minor”) 
 
In this short presentation, the semantical verification of the axiomatic and inferential 
principles is left as an exercise to the reader. I also leave it as a problem to show that modus 
Barcan and modus attestor cannot be strengthened as one should intuitively expect. 
We can by means of a fixed point construction going back to Andrea Cantini and 
Albert Visser isolate what we call manifestation points: If A(x,y) is a formula with the free 
variables shown we can find a term h
A
  such that ╟M∀z(z  h
ATTA(z,hA)). To prove this, 
take ordered pairs, e.g. à la Kuratowski, and suppose d={<x,g>:A(x,{u:<u,g> g})} and 
h
A
={x:<x,d> d}. Define KIND(x)=Dy(TyxTyx).  Taking H as the manifestation point 
of KIND(x)xy, we have that ╟MaH iff ╟MKIND(a)aH. We can then show that we for 
=={x:y(Øyz(zyz’y)xy)}, with z’={w:w=zwz}, have that ╟MH. From 
what we pointed out in the second paragraph, we indeed have fabulously much more as 
regards maxims relative to H. We may intuitively think of H as the set of hereditarily non-
paradoxical and, on account of our minimalist policy, wellfounded sets.  
Let ╟MKIND(f) and f a surjection from  to V={x:x=x}, and consider Cantor’s 
s={x:xNxf(x)}, i.e. s={x:xy(<x,y>fxy)}. Since ╟MKIND(f) and function(f) and 
╟M8 this reduces to ╟M8sT(8s). In the non-adjunctive framework of librationism it 
turns out that we only have the schemas ╟mATA and ╟mTAA in full generality, and not 
always the conjunction of instances as minor schemas such as these have minor instances. 
This and further schemas and inferential principles only license the conclusion that ╟8s and 
╟8s, i.e. ╟m8s. So s turns out to be paradoxical, just as Russell’s set. We underline that 
Cantor’s arguments are perfectly valid, but in librationism we find that the appropriate 
assumption to be discarded in the reductio is the camouflaged assumption that s is non-
paradoxical. Since f was taken as a KIND surjection from  to V, it is a fortiori onto the 
power set of .  
Other Cantorian arguments for higher infinities are dislodged for quite analogous or 
parallel reasons. I here leave residual matters for the reader’s meditation. It turns out as a 
consequence that the set of real numbers, taken e.g. by Dedekind cuts, is paradoxical, and so 
not listable. By this we mean that there is no non-paradoxical function from  which has 
exactly non-paradoxical real numbers as values; there are, I mention en passant, paradoxical 
Dedekind cuts or real numbers as e.g. {xQ:(x<Q0rr)(x<Q1rr)} where Q is the set of 
rational numbers, <
Q
 its standard ordering and r is Russell’s paradoxical set {x:xx}. Taking 
the real numbers by e.g. Cauchy-sequences does of course not alter the essential dialectics of 
the situation. Our observations are such that we are justified in thinking that librationism 
allows
3
 a non-paradoxical function from  onto V, and so also onto the set of real numbers. 
There are thus according to our librationist point of view no more real numbers than there are 
natural numbers.  
It is noteworthy in all of this to realize that virtually all power sets are paradoxical in 
librationism. I leave this as an exercise. Hint: Consider the manifestation point å such that 
╟M∀z(z åTTzå) and evaluate å’s membership with respect to the power sets of any set m 
such that it is not a maxim that m is coextensional with V={x:x=x}.  
We first pointed out that infinite power sets are not needed in order for the foundation 
of ordinary mathematics. Our results show that even if they are accommodated as in 
librationism, they do not here support Cantor’s conclusion as paradoxical phenomena are 
accounted for in such a way as to forestall one of Cantor’s essential though camouflaged 
assumptions. In this, we take librationism to somehow confirm the predicativist suspicions 
towards the use of power sets. 
Cantorianism, as I understand it here, includes the point of view that there is at least 
one infinite cardinality larger than 0. The foregoing serves to challenge this tenet of 
Cantorianism and mathematical orthodoxy. There are further philosophical considerations 
which pull in the same direction that I in conclusion of this note just briefly mention: (1) 
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 We have of course not by this shown that librationism as so far developed has such a surjection from  to V. I 
have shown in work that goes beyond what is presented here that  we may enlarge the librationist language with 
a new set constant  and have its denotatum serve as a bijection from  to V by just slightly altering the 
semantical set up. Furthermore, and importantly, we may extend the librationist language with set constants  
and T and have the denotatum of the former serve as a bijection as pointed out while the denotatum of the latter 
serves as a truth predicate on Gödel numbers of formulas; the semantical alterations needed are minor. The 
accommodation of a truth predicate depends upon having the universe denumerable. It is of strong philosophical 
interest to include a truth predicate because it helps us provide what I think is a favorable librationist account of 
the Liar’s paradox and related self referential semantical phenomena. Mathematically, a (non-paradoxical) 
bijection  is very useful as it provides important choice principles in many settings where desirable. 
Ontological economy suggests that Cantorianism is ontologically extravagant. (2) 
Cantorianism makes it impossible to presuppose an overarching philosophical meta-language. 
(3) If Cantorianism were true mathematical reality would need to exhibit disturbing essential 
traits of metaphysical incompleteness. (4) If we presuppose Cantorianism the question “How 
many objects are there?” becomes meaningless and cannot be answered; but it seems perfectly 
meaningful and in librationism has the answer that there are precisely countably infinitely 
many objects. 
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